

NON-GOVERNMENTAL RELIEF
TO GREECE: 1940-1949.
A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

By

Lisa Catherine Camichos

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
Of

Western Carolina University


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
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
Committee:



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to my father, Pano J. Camichos, for his efforts at finding and organizing my grandfather's papers. Had he not "uncovered" the information regarding the Orlando Plan this thesis would not have been researched or written.

I would also like to thank Dot Lyle (Aunt Dot) for her support. She provided me with a four day trip to Washington, D.C. that helped to fill in the gaps on my research. In addition, I would like to thank Leicha Pleiconnes (Aunt Leicha) for helping me translate some Greek documents, and providing me with insight into the situation in Volos, Greece during the 1940s.

To all my friends who provided me with moral support. Beth Lanes who woke up before dawn to go bicycling with me, Carol Farhat, Mary Kay and Pat, and Patti and Susan.

I am especially grateful to the following individuals who lived with this project every day: Jean B. Camichos and Lynn Smith (thank you both for helping me stick with this project, and for providing loving support); Ann Dunan, who edited the paper, and listened to me vent about all the re-writes; and, the staff at Riley & Associates, especially Erika Zipfel, Sheri Schobert, and Laney Lyons (that's L-A-N-E-Y). Your patience did not go unnoticed.

A special thanks goes to my grandparents, John and Geneva Camichos, who had the good sense to save everything! And, to my "granny," Estelle Burney, who left me with a terrific place in the mountains to write and gather my thoughts.

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To fight aloud is very brave
But gallanter, I know,
Who charge within their bosom,
The cavalry of war.

This paper is dedicated to
John and Geneva Camichos, Estelle Burney,
Irvin Joel Lyle III, and Rupert H. Davis

For such the angels go,
Rank after rank of even feet,
And uniforms of snow.

Emily Dickinson

To fight aloud is very brave
But gallanter, I know,
Who charge within their bosom,
The cavalry of woe.

Who win and nations do not see
Who fall and none observe,
Whose dying eyes no country
Regards with Patriot love.

We trust in plummed procession,
for such the angels go,
Rank after rank of even feet,
And uniforms of snow.

Emily Dickinson

Abstract

NON-GOVERNMENTAL RELIEF TO GREECE: 1940-1949. A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Lisa Catherine Camichos, M.A.

Western Carolina University, August 2000

Director: Dr. Gael Graham

The decade of the 1940s brought many hardships to Greece. In 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Greece and began a five year occupation of the country. After the occupation, in 1946, Greece became embroiled in a Civil War that pitted the communists against the Greek Nationals. Thousands of Greeks died during this period from starvation, sickness, and murder. It was not until 1947, with the adoption of the Truman Doctrine, that the United States government officially stepped in to assist Greece. However, from 1940-1947 several non-governmental groups arose which assisted the beleaguered Greeks during this difficult period.

This paper examines the development of three of these non-governmental organizations, the Greek War Relief Association, the Orlando Plan, and AHEPA. Using primary source material such as the New York Times, The Times (London), the Orlando Sentinel, as well as unpublished materials, this paper pieces together how these organizations came into existence, important individuals within each organization, and the amount of relief supplies provided to Greece by each group.

After establishing each group's contribution to Greece, the paper examines the development of the Truman Doctrine. Using United States government documents, memoirs, and secondary source materials the paper provides an insight into the debate surrounding the development of the Doctrine. In addition, the Revisionist and Post-Revisionist secondary sources demonstrate that the United States government assisted Greece for purposes of establishing American military bases in Greece. The paper goes on to compare the two forms of relief to Greece—non-governmental aid versus relief provided by the Truman Doctrine—and their affects on Greece.

Although it is clear that the Truman Doctrine provided more money to Greece than the non-governmental organizations, this paper questions motives behind governmental relief. With the non-governmental organizations, as those presented in this paper, the relief provided is strictly humanitarian. Unpublished letters from the papers of John P. Camichos provide examples of the appreciation shown by Greek citizens toward non-governmental relief. However, as historians such as Walter LaFeber surmise governmental relief is often provided with strings attached. Other historians such as Amikam Nachmani, Stephanos Zotos, and Lawrence Wittner point out that Greeks do not like the Truman Doctrine because they feel the United States used it as a tool to take away their sovereignty.

Chapter 1 Greece in the 1940s: A Brief Overview

December 7, 1941, the day that the Japanese Empire attacked Pearl Harbor, is a date that lives in the American psyche. It was on this date that America was drawn into World War II; however, the beginnings of seven years of European devastation began in 1939, with the Nazi invasion of Poland. Greece was among those countries devastated by the impact of the war. Between 1940 and 1947, the year that the Truman Doctrine came into effect and promised some relief for Greece, American citizens, Greek ex-patriots living in America, and American citizens of Greek extraction became the fundamental source for humanitarian aid for a populace that numbered approximately 11 million. These Americans came from all walks of life, and all cities and towns across the country. Proof of this is seen in newspaper articles, letters, civic newsletters, and other primary source documents. This study will attempt to reveal to the reader the importance of humanitarian aid provided by private citizens in America to Greek peoples, the sources of and motivation for those relief efforts, and the impact of American assistance on the Greek communities that received it.

The decade of the 1940s was an extremely difficult period for Greece. In October 1940, the Italians invaded Greece and were promptly defeated. Immediately following

this, in 1941 Germany invaded Greece. The German invasion and subsequent occupation brought death to millions of Greeks from starvation or atrocities committed by German and Bulgarian troops. In 1945, while the rest of Europe began recovering from World War II, a Civil War erupted in Greece between the Communists and the Greek government.¹

During the first days of January 1941, the Greek forces, without allied assistance, drove Italian forces back into Albania.² In an attempt to pull Mussolini out of trouble, Hitler decided to attack Greece.³ At 6:30 a.m. April 6, 1941, the German Minister at Athens informed the Greek Premier of Germany's intent to invade Greece.⁴ A few hours later, Nazi troops crossed the Yugoslavian border into Greece with a massive mechanized force, and Greece was involved in World War II.⁵

Prime Minister Winston Churchill realized that Greece was on the verge of collapsing and that any British troops remaining in Greece would expose the country to further devastation. With the consent of the Greek government, he began preparations for an evacuation of British diplomatic and military personnel to Crete. Members of the Greek government convened in Athens on 18 April to discuss their position and their

¹ Amikan Nachmani, "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49," *Journal of Contemporary History*, XXV (SAGE, London, Newbury Park, and New Delhi, 1990), 399.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 13 and 36. Hitler joined forces with Axis members Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for this attack.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 56. Germany decided to invade Greece on the grounds that British troops were stationed on the Greek mainland. The specific communiqué to Greece was: "The Reich government can no longer close their eyes to the fact that Greece is making common cause with Britain and must therefore be regarded as Germany's enemy . . . with all the consequences it entails."

⁵ "German Drive Slowed Down," *The Times* (London), 14 April 1941, 4a. Until this moment Greece had successfully defended herself against the Italians, and with the exception of a few days in October 1940, Greece had not fought on her own soil.

possible need to retreat to the Island of Crete.⁶

Withdrawal of the Greek government, as well as part of the Greek Army, to Crete commenced during the last week of April. By April 25, 1941 Greek troops remaining on the mainland either opted to quit the army, were murdered by Nazi soldiers, or joined the communist guerillas who remained on the mainland to fight the Germans. With the withdrawal of the last British troops, Germany acknowledged Greece's surrender. There was no need for signatures on formal documents, as no officials remained who could sign them. The war was technically over.⁷

Greek civilians immediately began to rebel against the German invaders. The Greek resistance against Germany began with two actions that infuriated the Nazis. In early 1941 during a visit to the Parthenon by officers, Major Yakoby and Captain Elsonits, from the invading Nazis army, encountered a Greek soldier standing guard by the Greek flag. When the officers ordered him to lower the flag he refused, and instead jumped to his death over the parapet of the Sacred Hill.⁸ The second act occurred in the first week of May 1941. Someone lowered the swastika flying over the Acropolis, and ripped it to shreds, scattering the pieces on the ground. After questioning Greeks living in the vicinity, and the night watchman, no evidence was uncovered. Nazi officials released a communiqué over Athens radio informing all German personnel that the

⁶ C.M. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949 (London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon), 1976, 241, 242.

⁷ Stephanos Zotos, Greece: The Struggle for Freedom, (New York: Crowell), 1967, 80. Zotos argues that the significance of the Greek-German war was the fact that by deciding to resist Nazi aggression, and overwhelming power, Greece forced Hitler to briefly fight a two-front war.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

resistance had started.⁹

The German occupation severed Greek society. The struggle for political power in Greece intensified during this time. The question of how to rid Greece of its German invaders increased internal strife between the communists and the Greek government-in-exile. At the start of the German occupation, Nazi officials surprisingly released many Communist leaders. During WWI the Germans also released many communist leaders, including Lenin whom they sent back to Russia. The outcome of Lenin's release was, of course, the Russian Revolution. It is likely that the Nazis were attempting to recreate the same type of situation in Greece, which as we will discover later, is exactly what happened. The communists excelled at organizing people, and as a result they created several different resistance organizations in the first winter of 1941. The National and Social Liberation party (*Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis*) or EKKA represented people whose politics were liberal republican. The second largest group, EDES, had strong backing in the northwest sections of Greece.¹⁰ The largest organization, and the only one with a nationwide following, was the Communist-backed National Liberation Front (*Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopan*, hereafter EAM). The EAM appealed to the young and enthusiastic because of its daring exploits against the Nazi invaders; however, all of these groups were communist front organizations. Many older people joined the group simply because it represented the strongest resistance group in or near their hometown or mountain village. During the beginning stages of the resistance, EAM built

⁹ *Ibid.*, 106. See also : C.M. Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece*, 244.

¹⁰ C.M. Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece*, 244.

up such an active organization that it was largely responsible for shaking the Greek people out of the lethargy into which they had sunk.¹¹

Realizing the importance of Greece to the Middle Eastern campaign, the Allies were willing to use EAM in fighting the occupation and to postpone the day of political reckoning in Greece. Britain found EAM of great use when securing possession of those areas that included lines of communication between the Germans and their forces in Africa. Consequently, for a considerable period the Allies provided large amounts of equipment, munitions, and other supplies to the fighters of EAM.¹²

EAM differed from the other groups in the nature of its goals, which included not only the expulsion of the Germans but the total transformation of Greek society along Soviet political lines. EAM also had its own foreign relations system through which they collaborated with the Allies, via the British Military Mission, and with their neighboring Communist countries of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Finally, through Tito, in Yugoslavia, they communicated with Soviet Russia.¹³

By the end of 1942, EAM was influential in both the cities and mountains. It also organized strikes and public demonstrations, recruited using heavy social pressure and threats, and created special intimidation groups to prevent desertion from the ranks. It eliminated competing organizations by either disbanding them or integrating their own forces into the rival group. During the early part of 1944 the EAM gained power and

¹¹ Jane Carey & Clark Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics (New York: Columbia University Press) 1968, 129.

¹² *Ibid.*, 128.

¹³ Zotos, Greece: The Struggle for Freedom, 108.

expanded its influence outside the country. In March 1944, it established the Political Committee of National Liberation in the mountain regions consisting solely of representative from EAM groups, and represented a direct challenge to the authority of the Greek government-in-exile. Once established, this committee sent a message to the government-in-exile informing it that the committee's purpose was the establishment of a Government of National Unity. This letter served notice to the Greek Government that the nucleus of an alternative government was in place.¹⁴ Thus, while the Greeks were trying to fight the Nazis they were also fighting a war among themselves for ultimate control of Greece.¹⁵ Later on the fighting between these two groups caused the Greek Civil War and subsequent United States intervention.

* * *

Three schools of thought exist concerning historical writings on World War II and the Cold War: Traditional, Revisionist, and Post-Revisionist. A brief overview of these categories will assist the reader in understanding where this particular thesis fits into historical writings.

Traditionalists account for the writings between the mid-1940s and the late 1960s. The underlying premise of these works is that the Soviet Union is the primary cause for the outbreak of the Cold War. Work from this school of thought include Louis Koenig, *The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practices*, Lawrence Kaplan, *Recent American Foreign Policy, Conflicting Interpretations*, and Joseph Marion, *The Fifteen*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 130.

¹⁵ Zotos, *Greece: The Struggle for Freedom*, 108, 109, 120.

Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947). These works were written before any United States military and government documents became de-classified.¹⁶

Revisionist interpretations are found in works from the 1970s. Authors from this school of thought include Walter LaFeber, who wrote *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents*. Writers during this time were privy to declassified American governments documents that broadened their view of how the Cold War began. Problems in Vietnam also influenced these historians; their writings reflect the argument that the American government and the capitalistic United States required overseas expansion, which made conflict with other countries inevitable. These works also suggest that the Truman Doctrine included wording that would allow the U.S. to invade other countries in the name of democracy.

Post-revisionist historians, including John Gaddis, (*The United States and the Cold War*), Terry Anderson, (*The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War 1944-1947*), and Howard Jones, (*"A New Kind of War" America's Global Strategy and The Truman Doctrine in Greece*), also stress the use of archival materials. In addition, they include insights into the personalities involved in government decision making during the Cold War. These historians argue regarding the theory that the United States government acted out of selfishness when developing Cold War policies. So in sum, they agree with the revisionists.¹⁷

Ironically, few historians have dealt with the Greek experience during either

¹⁶ Richard Dean Burn (ed.) *Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700*, (Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio), 1983, 701.

¹⁷ Ibid.

occupation or the civil war. Interest in the Nazi occupation of Greece is limited. Amikan Nachmani, a revisionist historian, opines that interest is limited because of the greater impact the war had on the rest of the world. Nachmani also notes that little is written by historians of Greek descent because the subject is "emotionally charged and highly controversial," due to the events both during and after the war. The majority of books written in Greek were not translated into other languages. In addition, the plight of Greece did not cause the same emotional fervor as the Spanish Civil War, with its international brigades.

I agree with the Revisionist and Post-Revisionist historians, in that the United States acted out of selfish reasons when developing the Truman Doctrine. However, I find myself at odds with these same historians because they focus mainly on the United States and Russia. What is missing from their accounts is the situation in Greece, and how it was affected by WWII and the Greek Civil War, as well as how it affected the rest of the world. Greece is often overlooked it seems, because its role is perceived as being that of a pawn in the Cold War game. It is my feeling that the Nazi occupation in Greece, and the subsequent Greek Civil War played a bigger role in world affairs that needs mentioning in historical accounts of this era. WWII and the Nazi occupation of Greece were one of many similar situations that brought WWII into American newspapers and media. These two events caused many Americans to rally together in an attempt to help the war torn country of Greece. The Greek Civil War also influenced the United States, and the world, in that it provided for the United States foreign policy initiative known as

the Truman Doctrine.

Historically, this work fits into the post-revisionist category of historical writings, as it proposes that the United States developed the Truman Doctrine for selfish purposes; in this case, allowing the United States to establish military bases in Greece to monitor communist activities. No historians have attempted to study the impact of non-governmental relief to Greece from 1940-1947- seven years of Greek history that is often overlooked in favor of the Truman Doctrine. This paper studies the relief efforts of three non-governmental organizations, the Greek War Relief Association, the Orlando Plan, and AHEPA (American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association) and compares their humanitarian efforts to the Truman Doctrine-- a foreign policy initiative developed in 1947 by the Truman Administration as a result of a perceived communist threat to Europe.

In November 1940, Germany divided Greece into three sections: Italy occupied Epirus, Thessaly, the coast of Saronikos, the Peloponnese, the island of Cyclades, and Central Greece; Bulgaria, as a reward for having allowed Nazi troops to use their territory to invade Greece, annexed territory in Macedonia and Western Thrace; and Germany retained control of Athens, Central Macedonia, Eastern Evros, and the islands of Lemnos, Mytilene, and Chios. Nazi soldiers burned crops and killed livestock, while Bulgarian

troops imposed military rule, closed churches, and schools, and seized private property.¹ The first massacres of Greek civilians occurred under the direction of the Bulgarians in the towns of Drama, Kavala, and the village of Doroiton.² In the province of Epirus Nazi troops razed twenty-six villages, killing the majority of the villagers. Nazi troops also committed heinous crimes in Larissa, Kalavryta, and Athens. There were 762,000 homeless victims in Greece.³

Chapter 2
Nazi Occupation and
the Greek War Relief Association

Greeks who had resided in areas bombed out by the invading armies now lived in caves and cellars. As a result of the devastation to livestock and crops nearly 12,000 people stood in bread lines daily. Some people starved, the as many as 2 million children, plus countless numbers of adults would die from starvation during the coming winter of 1940-1941.⁴ In the winter of 1942, less than one year after the start of the German occupation, some 450,000 Greeks died of starvation. As the occupation lengthened, and camps reached American shores, a group of Greek-Americans, and Greek ex-patriots joined together to relieve the suffering of those trapped in Nazi occupied Greece.

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¹ "Greek Children Face Starvation," *New York Times*, September 21, 1941, 72. The loss of livestock in Henry Hull, *Emergency Relief in Greece After Liberation*, Prometheus Books, New York, Near East Foundation, 1943), pp. 66. It is unclear how many people were killed, but reports from Greece indicate that over half of each village's population was massacred.
² Greek War Relief Association, *Remember Greece* (New York: Greek War Relief Association, Inc., 1945), 10.
³ *Ibid.*
⁴ Stephanos Zotos, *Greece: The Struggle For Freedom* (New York: Crowell, 1967), 121.

troops imposed military rule, closed churches, and schools, and seized private property.¹ The first massacres of Greek civilians occurred under the direction of the Bulgarians in the towns of Drama, Kavalla, and the village of Doxaton.² In the province of Epirus Nazi troops razed twenty-six villages, and executed the majority of the villagers. Nazi troops also committed heinous crimes in Larissa, Kalavryta, and Athens. There were 762,000 homeless victims in Greece.³

Greeks who had resided in areas bombed-out by the invading armies now lived in caves and cellars. As a result of the devastation to livestock and crops nearly 12,000 people stood in bread lines, daily. Some people feared that as many as 2 million children, plus countless numbers of adults, would die from starvation during the coming winter of 1940-1941.⁴ In the winter of 1942, less than one year after the start of the German occupation, some 450,000 Greeks died of starvation. As the occupation lengthened, and Greek resistance groups retaliated against Nazi control, the situation became progressively worse. Whenever a Greek shot a German soldier, the Nazi's retaliated by hanging civilian hostages at dawn, and leaving their bodies hanging with signs warning other Greeks that this was the way the Third Reich handled resisters. By 1945, fifty Greeks were executed for each Nazi soldier killed.⁵

¹ "Greek Children Face Starvation," New York Times, September 21, 1941, 7:2. The loss of livestock in the outlying villages destroyed more than half of the country's milk production.

² Henry Hill, Emergency Relief in Greece After Liberation. Preliminary Plan, (New York: Near East Foundation, 1943), pg. 66. It is unclear how many people were killed, but reports from Greece indicate that over half of each town's population was massacred.

³ Greek War Relief Association, Remember Greece, (New York: Greek War Relief Association, Inc., 1945), 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Stephanos Zotos, Greece: The Struggle For Freedom, (New York: Crowell, 1967), 121.

News of these atrocities coming out of Greece was scant, but information that reached America caused an outcry from Greek-Americans and Greek ex-patriots. Realizing the grave importance of the situation, a group 1,400 individuals from all walks of life, including private citizens and public figures formed an organization, to help the citizens of Greece, called Greek War Relief Association (hereafter the GWRA).⁶ The GWRA took its philosophy from the National Committee on Food for Small Democracies founded by Herbert Hoover during WWI. Both groups maintained that concern for civilians must be the main reason behind any relief effort.⁷

The Greek War Relief Association organized a committee to oversee the relief supplies to Greece. The committee consisted of Americans of Greek extraction with business interests here and abroad. Committee members included, among others, Spyros Skouras, President of the National Theatre, representing the Eastern States; Tom Pappas, head of a grocery chain, representing the New England region; and, S. Rakkas, a Chicago Theatre owner, who represented the Midwest.⁸ Interestingly the West Coast and South are not included. I find this especially interesting since the city of Orlando, Florida proved instrumental in a similar, later relief effort to Greece.

These people, with their knowledge of Greece, put their respective organizations at the disposal of the Greek War Relief Association Committee. The President, faculty,

⁶ Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, "Collier's," Feb. 20, 1943, 326. Note: This organization was founded in November 1940, in an effort to promote negotiations with the British and German governments, and to mobilize public support for the effort. The committee consisted of 1,400 leading Americans including 500 religious leaders of various denominations; 400 educators; over 200 top publishers, editors, and writers; and, 300 leading citizens. The citizens group included 12 former ambassadors, or ministers, 20 former high government officials, General Pershing, and Admiral Pratt.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ "Group to Aid Greece in War Formed Here," New York Times, November 14, 1940, 1:2.

and staff, as well as the student body of Athens College (Greece) worked to assist the GWRA in Athens with food distribution. American Express used its staff of experts for purchasing and distributing relief supplies. The National Bank's clerical staff kept all records for the Association.⁹

In late 1940, the GWRA committee held an election for a chairman. Upon recommendation from philanthropists and politicians, the committee elected Spyros Skouras, President of Fox Studios, as chairman, and Harold S. Vanderbilt, Director of the New York City Railroad, as honorary chairman. The GWRA sent Skouras to Washington, D.C. where he spent several weeks meeting with various key political figures and others trying to drum up support, as well as government assistance, for the newly-formed GWRA. The United States government sympathized with the plight of Greece and agreed to help; but in an effort to remain officially neutral, the government needed assurance that an enormous amount of supplementary work would emanate from the GWRA.¹⁰

After meeting with members of the State Department, the U.S. government agreed to establish an administrative committee on Crete that would be in charge of relief shipments onto mainland Greece. The State Department wanted the committee on Crete because the island was the only unoccupied territory of Greece, which meant less diplomatic problems with food shipments. Also, officials in Washington, D.C. believed

⁹ Hill, *Emergency Relief in Greece*, 69.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

that Crete would hold against Nazi aggression; however, if it fell, any unexpended relief funds and supplies could be returned the United States for distribution after the war.¹¹

These meetings also included talks on Skouras's role as a diplomat with the other countries involved in the relief efforts -- Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, and Great Britain. It was his responsibility to get relief through German lines, with Swedish and Swiss ships, without threat of Nazi interference. These vessels would be used for the sole purpose of shipping supplies to non-military personnel, specifically women, and children in Nazi occupied Greece. Since the Swedes possessed idle ships, that they would not risk for belligerent service, they readily chartered them for humanitarian use.¹²

Skouras also needed to open diplomatic channels with Great Britain, which had imposed a blockade of Greece. The British Board of Trade and the Ministry of Economic Warfare announced that it considered Greece, except for Crete, an enemy occupied territory for the purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This announcement made it illegal to participate in commercial, financial, or other dealings with, or for the benefit of, any person in that territory.¹³ Through diplomatic channels, the GWRA obtained assistance from the Turkish Ambassador to intervene with the British government on behalf of Greece. Despite its own warring history with Greece, Turkey felt a moral obligation to assist its neighbor, and obtained permission from the British government for the dispatch of 50,000 tons of foodstuffs to Greece.¹⁴

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹² *Ibid.*, 326.

¹³ "Greece Blockade," *The Times* (London), 1941 May 1, 14c.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* It appears that these relief supplies were sent from the United States to Turkey and then to Greece.

A diplomatic agreement with Germany was also obtained that allowed food to pass into Nazi-occupied territory without any direct, or indirect, advantage gained by Nazi troops.¹⁵ In order to calm the fears that Nazi troops would benefit from the food being sent for the civilian Greek population, the stocks of food items at no time amounted to over a two months supply in the event that Nazi soldiers seized it. To further protect the relief supplies, the program made sure that the all food went directly to soup kitchens, and promised to withdraw relief if any violation of the agreement occurred.¹⁶ Germany's agreement with the GWRA was probably an attempt to make themselves appear as something besides the international outlaws people perceived them as being.

The GWRA's administrative committee developed several programs to determine the amount of food to be rationed. Since famine was the greatest concern in Greece, the committee's primary goal was to feed the population. Other lesser goals included medical assistance for civilians, clothing the civilian population, housing civilians, and, supplementing the efforts of the Greek government to assist wounded soldiers.¹⁷

According to Henry Hill, State Department representative assigned to the GWRA, the Greek War Relief Association placed emphasis on surveys. A house to house survey determined the exact situation in each home, and allowed the association to distribute food ration cards according to need. The safest means of determining the appropriate food supply was to calculate the regular meals consumed by the average Greek before the war, distinguishing between the urban and rural populations. A Greek's diet consisted of

¹⁵ *Ibid.* See also "Food Supplies For Greece," *The Times* (London), 1941 September 11, 3d- The United States government certified that no Nazi personnel would receive any relief intended for civilians.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Hill, *Emergency Relief in Greece*, 5.

bread, for both urban and rural areas, while urban dwellers ate more meat, and rural peoples consumed more olives, cheese, and vegetables.¹⁸

For the first six-month period, the GWRA was committed to sending over one million tons of foodstuffs to Greece, including meats, grains, dairy products, and vegetables. Of these food items, half would be distributed in the form of cooked food at soup kitchens. This ensured that those needing assistance received the food, with no possibility of it being resold on the black market. Soup kitchens were established at chief centers of population, such as large cities, or large villages surrounded by suburbs. A certain percentage (not found in research) was distributed to those families who could not stand in lines at the soup kitchens. In addition, a percentage of raw foodstuffs were distributed as payment for work, for those involved in the GWRA work programs.¹⁹

In addition to its commitment to sending food, the GWRA established another program whereby Greeks would receive relief in exchange for labor. Only in extreme cases would Greeks receive payment for work. Workshops in Athens, and other large cities, manufactured thousands of pieces of clothing daily. Other projects included the construction of air-raid shelters in the cities hardest hit by the bombings. Many of these projects included villages in districts where, due to lack of transportation, no food had been obtained for months. Some workshops paid daily wages, and employed the wives and dependents of mobilized soldiers, people suffering from bombings, and the most needy.²⁰

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 35, 72.

¹⁹ GWRA, *Remember Greece*, 10.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

With the design of the GWRA in place, and the discussions with the United States government over, Skouras set the fund raising goal for 1940 at \$12 million.²¹ However, by December 1940, the organization had raised only \$600,000; the largest single contribution coming from J.D. Rockefeller who gave \$10,000.00 towards the effort.²² By March 1941, the GWRA was substantially closer to its goal with the amount of moneys collected totaling \$4.5 million, ninety-percent of which was raised by Greek-American civic groups.

The motion picture industry provided a great deal of funding for Greek war relief. Although no hard data were found, it seems that the motion picture industry contributed both monetarily and in time spent at fund raisers because the fact that Skouras was President of one the largest film studios, and had a great deal of influence with other studio executives. Moreover, in February 1941, over 10,000 motion picture theaters joined the drive for Greece. Also in that same month, the largest daily total of \$102,000 and weekly total of \$206,000 was contributed by the Southern California division of the motion picture industry, with Samuel Goldwyn as chairman. Goldwyn contributed a single check in the amount of \$50,000 on behalf of himself and his fellow producers. Spyros Skouras, president of Fox Studios, got Fox/Paramount involved by filming several documentaries on various fund-raising activities throughout the country.²³

²¹ "Drive For Greek Relief Opened," New York Times, October 21, 1940, 1:1.

²² "\$250,000 More For Greeks," New York Times, December 11, 1940, 2:1. See also "Support Aid For Greeks," New York Times, December 12, 1940, 2:5; and, "Medical Aid Given to Civilians," New York Times, December 22, 1940, 6:1.

²³ "\$30,606 More for Greeks," New York Times March 31, 1941, 2:1. See also: "Theatres to Aid Greeks," New York Times, February 17, 1941, 11:4; "Gifts to Greek Fund Rise," New York Times, February 22, 1941, 12:4; "A Testament to Greek Courage," New York Times, August 8, 1943, I, 3:1. Shrine of Victory was the first feature length documentary on the Greek participation in WWII.

Although the New York Times reported that Americans perceived the GWRA and its relief efforts as having a tremendous impact on Greece, the situation was in fact getting worse. In March 1942 the GWRA chartered the Swedish ship *Sicilia*, and arranged to sail from New York.²⁴ However, reports from Greece stated that only 1% of the 50,000 tons of food shipped passed through the blockade.²⁵ The editor of the Turkish Newspaper VATAN went to Greece along with this food shipment from the GWRA and wrote the following: "What I saw in Greece exceeds a hundred times anything that has been written about her plight. It seemed to me that I had entered hell. The people looked like skeletons."²⁶ The captain of the ship remarked that the people of Athens were gaunt and hungry. No horses, dogs, or cats roamed the streets as they had all been eaten.²⁷

In May 1942 the GWRA received more information on the plight of Greece. A cablegram from the Red Cross disclosed the fact that, to date, shipments of food sent by the GWRA, from Turkish and other Near East ports, provided only 1,100 grams of bread per day for half the population, with no fats or meats allocated.²⁸ GWRA officials also received a report from a select committee of Greek economists and humanitarians noting that a minimum of 38,000 tons of varied food stuffs were needed to prevent millions from dying of starvation in the coming winter. As a result of this information, Skouras and the GWRA began new shipping programs in August 1942, that allowed foodstuffs earmarked

²⁴ "Food Supplies for Greece," The Times (London), 1941 September 11, 3d. The Vanderbilt Committee, and American organization, reimbursed the GWRA for the value of the relief supplies.

²⁵ "Plan to Feed Greece Boggled in Difficulty," New York Times, February 13, 1942, 12:4.

²⁶ "Greeks Dying by the Thousands," Vatan, 1942.

²⁷ Greek War Relief Association, *Remember Greece*, 6-7.

²⁸ "Greece Suffering Shortage of Food," New York Times, May 6, 1942, 2:2.

for Greece to be shipped from Canadian ports, in the hopes that more food would pass through the British blockade.²⁹ Despite the GWRA's best diplomatic efforts the British blockade on Greece was still in effect. On August 3, 1942, three Swedish steamers chartered by the GWRA left Montreal with 15,000 tons of grain and 50 tons of medical supplies. This began a series of monthly grain shipments to Greece with safe conduct guaranteed by all belligerent nations, including Britain, as well as guaranteed distribution of the relief supplies to the Greek people.³⁰ This effort, too, proved inadequate. By October 1942, GWRA reports from Greece showed that 1,000 Greeks died from starvation every day and only 1 out of 7 children survived the year.³¹ This prompted Skouras to start a \$1 million relief campaign over the next year.³² Reports from the GWRA stated that in a mere 4-month period between August 1942 and December 1942, 78,000 tons of foodstuffs were shipped to Greece. Joseph Larkin, the GWRA Treasurer, reported that since the start of the organization in 1940, \$5.5 million had been spent on relief supplies to Greece, with contributions over the past two years totaling \$6 million.

During the following two years, 1943 and 1944, the GWRA contributions declined. It is interesting to note the correlation between this drop in contributions and America's involvement in WWII. During the first year of its existence, late-1940 through November 1941, American citizens contributed \$4.75 million towards relief for Greece. However, by 1942, with America now heavily involved in two theatres of WWII, news regarding the GWRA dwindled, and consequently, so did the contributions. By July

²⁹ A.C. Sedgewick, "Aid to Greece Called Too Scant," *New York Times*, October 12, 1942 1:1-4).

³⁰ "3 Food Ships Ready to Sail for Greece," *New York Times*, August 3, 1942, 7:1-2).

³¹ Sedgewick, *Aid to Greece*, 1:1-4.

³² "2 Greek Brigades Fighting in Egypt," *New York Times*, October 28, 1942, 11:1.

1943, three years after its inception, the association had raised only \$10 million in relief contributions for Greece. While this amount is \$2 million short of the intended goal it nonetheless indicates that Americans were attempting to help those affected by WWII. One reason for the GWRA falling short of its goals is that as news from Europe reached America regarding the devastation of WWII, many other charitable organizations were formed. Americans were probably solicited for contributions from many relief organizations, and as the war progressed and the amount of charitable groups grew, the pockets of American citizens did not.³³

Despite falling short of its goal the GWRA relieved the suffering of many Greeks. By May 1, 1944, the GWRA had purchased over 117,000 standard "Red Cross Food Packages" for sick and wounded Greek soldiers and prisoners of war. The Association also had purchased 200 wheelchairs for use by crippled Greek veterans. Its impact on the civilian population was even greater. By 1944, the GWRA had provided over 5 million Greeks with one daily meal. In addition, the association had provided 16 million garments and 50,000 pairs of shoes to Greek civilians. This organization had done much to relieve the suffering of so many; however, Greece's troubles with the Nazis were only the beginning to the saga of country's troubles. By 1945, a Civil War raged through the countryside claiming even more lives than the Nazi invaders. Greece still needed assistance during the post-war years, but with the rest of the world also recovering from the war, where could it turn to for help?

³³ "Tells of Aid to Greece," New York Times, December 2, 1942, 28:5. I do not have the exact totals for the years 1942-1945.

Chapter 3 The Orlando Plan and AHEPA: Post-War Relief

In the spring of 1946, a bare year after the end of World War Two in Europe, a Greek-American living in Florida received a shocking letter from his brothers still living in Greece. John Camichos, restaurant owner, was horrified to learn of the conditions in his hometown of Volos, in Northeastern Greece. Letters received from his brothers George and Stavros Camichos, in early April 1946, described severe conditions in the city. Money was worthless, and food was badly needed. Italian and German troops had wrecked the waterfront installations around the bay, leaving boats stranded in the harbor, and the Nazis had prohibited small boats from launching off the beaches. George also wrote of the devastation left in the farming areas of Volos by both the Italians, and Germans who killed livestock, burned crops, and destroyed roads.¹ Upon reading these letters John Camichos feared villagers of Volos would die from starvation, as crops were not due in until June or July, thus leaving 120 days of waiting for the seeds to germinate in the ground.

In a public radio address, in April 1946, President Truman urged the American public to help the starving peoples of Europe. He recalled how individual Americans

¹ George Camichos, Volos, Greece to John Camichos, Orlando Florida, 3 April 1946, Private papers of John P. Camichos, Collection of Lisa C. Camichos, [translated by Lisa C. Camichos].

adopted orphans from other countries, and encouraged Americans to continue this practice.²

Upon hearing this plea, Mrs. Margaret Bowe, a resident of Orlando, Florida decided to expand on this idea. Mrs. Bowe, a businesswoman and member of the Business and Professional Women's Club, realized that adopting an entire city would save more lives than attempting to work with individual orphans. She sent a proposal to the Orlando Jaycees Club suggesting Orlando be the first city in the country to adopt an entire city in Europe, feeding and clothing the population for three months, during which time the crops would be ready for harvesting. This adopted city would be equal in size and population to Orlando, which called itself the "City Beautiful."³

On Monday, April 22, 1946, the Jaycees unanimously voted to accept Mrs. Bowe's challenge, and began the development of what came to be known as the Orlando Plan. Directed by the Jaycees, the Orlando Plan also received support from civic groups, government organizations, churches, schools, and other clubs in the Orlando area. The objective of the Orlando Plan was to collect canned or dried food stuffs, and clothing to send to a European city, the adoption of which would be determined by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration or other government organizations. Major-General Donald Wilson, Commanding General Headquarters, AAF Proving Ground Command, pledged the support and cooperation of the local army base by

² "Jaycees, Local Clubs Join In Food Campaign," Orlando Morning Sentinel, April 23, 1946, 2:1.

³ "Orlando Urged to Adopt Same Sized European City, Send Food to Its Starving Citizens," Orlando Morning Sentinel, April 18, 1946.

agreeing to store all the food in the base warehouse.⁴ The Jaycee's Warehousing Committee Chairman, Cecil Farris, would make certain that the food stored in the warehouses was sorted, packed, and shipped to the appropriate city.⁵ With the logistics determined, the Orlando Jaycees now faced the task of selecting a city to adopt. The Jaycees petitioned for assistance from the offices of Elizabeth Carr, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration staff member in Washington, D.C., and Florida Senator Claude Pepper to help them determine which European city faced the greatest danger from starvation.⁶ An unexpected illness of Mrs. Carr compelled the Jaycees to select its own city, which it did in April 1946. UNRRA confirmed their request, and on April 25, 1946, the Jaycees announced that the Greek village of Volos would receive relief supplies from Orlando.⁷ The United Nations agreed to deliver the relief supplies; however, transportation problems caused by the German occupation and the Greek Civil War made it impossible for them to guarantee that the supplies would reach the city of Volos. The best they could guarantee was that the supplies would reach a city in Greece.⁸

During a special banquet, the Jaycees made a second public announcement that Volos, Greece was their adoption choice. John Camichos thanked the civic groups for selecting his native town, and provided a narrative description of the village that showed

⁴ *Ibid.*, 5:5.

⁵ "Housewives Aid Campaign," *Orlando Morning Sentinel*, April 23, 1946, 2:1.

⁶ "Adopted City Food Coming In; Women to Meet This Morning," *Orlando Morning Sentinel*, April 25, 1946, 1:4.

⁷ "Volos to Get Orlando Food," *Orlando Morning Sentinel*, April 26, 1946, 1:2. The author has been unable to locate any information regarding the selection process.

⁸ *Ibid.* Also see: "First Steers to Be Canned for Volos Slaughtered Saturday," *Orlando Morning Sentinel*, May 5, 1946, 5:6. Dr. Gilbert Osincups, "Starvation Rampant in Greece, Need for Food Grows Daily," *Orlando Morning Sentinel*, May 27, 1946, 27:3 & 4.

the similarities between Volos and Orlando. Situated in Thessaly, an area of Northeastern Greece, Volos is located on the Gulf of Volos, an inlet to the Aegean Sea. Its climate is much colder in winter, but the area farmers grow oranges, grapes, and "truck crops." The population of both cities ranged around 48,000. In addition, 24 villages surround Volos, much like Orlando, which is the hub of Central Florida. According to Camichos, the view from the Halifax River, which runs between Daytona Beach and New Smyrna Beach, Florida, is almost a picture of Volos.⁹

Although the exact role Camichos played in the decision to adopt Volos is unclear, The Union of Agents of Insurance Companies Operating in Volos and Thessaly honored him as having been the main catalyst for the action. In a formal letter, dated May 28, 1946, the group stated,

... on hearing that the civic leaders have adopted Volos, we knew that you have played an important and serious part in this kind resolution for which we wish to express our thanks heartily ... such resolutions honour not only the citizens of the city of Orlando, but all the Americans too, ... we shall be grateful forever. ... our Union pray to Heaven to bless You, the choiced child of Pelion, and your Family, and to shower down upon you all the joys and happiness of life.¹⁰

John Camichos was no stranger to relief efforts for Greece. From the beginning of the war he had been involved in sending aid to many Greeks; however, these relief efforts were not accomplished through the work of an organization, but by Camichos himself. In response to letters from family, friends, and strangers, he spent hundreds of dollars for clothes, food, medicine, medical supplies, and freight costs, in order to help

⁹ "Volos to Get Orlando Food," Orlando Morning Sentinel, April 26, 1946, 9:11.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

those trapped in Nazi occupied Greece.¹¹

For example, Camichos sent aid to his sister's family, the Volovini's, still living in Volos. Previously, Camichos's cousin, Jimmy Pleicones was the Volovini's main financial supporter during the war years; however, in October 1945, Jimmy asked John to take over the responsibilities of sending aid to the entire family in Volos. Unable to continue working because of high blood pressure, Pleicones wrote, "I can't help him anymore (referring to George Volovini, Camichos's brother-in-law), . . . please take over this duty for me."¹²

Camichos received many letters from Volovini. In 1945, Volovini wrote that well after four years of tyranny, starvation, and fear, he and his family still did not know if they would live to see another day. Before the war, they owned a prospering hotel by the seashore. The Germans arrived, took everything, and tore down all the businesses by the seashore. "God granted us our lives, but we lost everything," stated Volovini. In closing, Volovini pleaded for assistance. He noted that Camichos was far from the terrible war, and that those who had nothing prayed that God would help him have a successful business so that he might send money to the needy.¹³

In 1946, Volovini wrote thanking Camichos for the money he had provided them. Bad news also accompanied this letter, however. George Camichos, John's brother, was

¹¹ Only six of the shipping transactions were salvageable, dating from 1945-1946. Earlier shipping transactions, dating from 1941-1945, were in very poor condition. In addition, all the shipping companies are no longer in operation.

¹² Jimmy Pleicones, Spartanburg, South Carolina, to John Camichos, Orlando, Florida, October, 1945, Private papers of John P. Camichos, Collection of Lisa C. Camichos, [translated by Leicha Pleicones.]

¹³ *Ibid.*

in serious condition from a heart attack or stroke brought about by pressures of the war. They had taken him to every doctor in town, but none could help him. In addition, Persephone, Volovini's wife, and Camichos's sister, sustained a leg injury, also a result of the war, and there was no money available for her to see a doctor. According to this letter, money they received from John Camichos was almost worthless because of inflation. "Before the war, five-hundred drachmas equaled one U.S. dollar, but now it takes five-thousand drachmas to equal one U.S. dollar."¹⁴

Camichos also received letters from the citizens of Volos who were not related to him. One such letter, from artist Costa Zimmeris, described the hardships he experienced during 1941-1944, the years of German occupation. "The bombs destroyed many homes and I with my family (4 children and wife) was [sic] hiding in the woods, chased by the German Gestapo, because we loved much [sic] the freedom of our beautiful country." The letter continued with a plea for old clothing in exchange for drawings that Zimmeris would send later.¹⁵

Camichos received many letters from both family and strangers. These letters told of the horrors of German occupation, and the plight of villagers in post-war Volos, and some even asked for assistance with immigration to the United States. With the inception of Orlando Plan, however, Camichos focused his attention on assisting Volos through this

¹⁴ [Stavros Camichos, Volos, Greece], to John Camichos, Orlando, Florida, February 1946, Private papers of John P. Camichos, Collection of Lisa C. Camichos, [translated by Leicha Pleicones.] Note: this letter was received before the development of the Orlando Plan, and may have prompted John to push for the adoption of Volos by the city of Orlando.

¹⁵ "Volos, Greece Suffered Heavy Damage As The Result of Many German and Italian Air Raids," *Orlando Jaycees*, May 30, 1946, vol. X, No.1.

organization.

When the Orlando Plan first started, the Orlando Morning Sentinel requested the Associated Press to locate Mr. L.S. (Soc) Chakales, a former Sentinel sports writer and graduate of Rollins College in Winter Park, Florida. In May 1946, Martin Anderson, owner and editor of the Orlando Morning Sentinel, asked Chakales to travel to Greece and report back with news from Volos. Chakales's reports to the Sentinel conveyed the hardships in the village due to the German occupation. When Nazi troops first arrived in 1941, they packed and shipped the entire stock of raw materials for Volos's textile mills, cigarette factories, iron foundries, and flourmills back to Germany. Nazi troops also took factory machinery, furniture, and personal possessions for shipment back to Germany. What personal property they did not steal they destroyed, with actual, physical property damages in the city estimated at millions of U.S. dollars.

Other reports from Chakales told of the horrors inflicted by Nazi soldiers. As was the case in the rest of Greece, hundreds of villagers in Volos died in the streets from starvation in the winter of 1941-1942. At the time of the German occupation, Volos had a population of approximately 50,000. Official records revealed that 169 people died in 1940, while the total death toll climbed to 1,013 in 1941. The worst year was 1942 when 2,585 people died from starvation. While starvation claimed many citizens of Volos, German vindictiveness took the lives of many others. Reports surfaced regarding numerous instances of Germans executing from one to twenty villagers. In the spring of 1943, following an attack on German officers by *Andartes*, Greek freedom fighters, Nazi

soldiers gathered 12 villagers, including women and children, and took them to a churchyard on a nearby Pellion mountain. There, within those sacred walls, they machine-gunned them to death.¹⁶

The accounts presented by Camichos and Chakales reinforced earlier reports from Greece. In April 1941, the Times London printed several articles regarding air raids in Northern Greece, including Volos. On April 3, 1941, Italian aircraft bombed the poorest quarter of Volos, wounding a few persons, including women and children, and destroying cottages.¹⁷ Ten days later German aircraft bombed Volos in three waves. No casualties were reported, and three of the planes were shot down.¹⁸ Two days later Volos experienced the worst of the German air raids. In an attempt to render the "aerodrome" (an airfield) at Larissa useless, the Luftwaffe inflicted heavy damages on nearby towns, including Volos. Although British troops shot down two Junger-88's over Volos, the population suffered severely.¹⁹ The last report from Volos appeared on April 22, 1941. The Luftwaffe attacked British troopships off the East Coast of Greece and sank a 7,000-ton merchant ship in Volos harbor.²⁰

Fiorello La Guardia, Chief of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), said that Greece was one of the hardest hit countries in Europe. Hunger and famine were rampant, with people outside of Athens surviving on

¹⁶ L.S. Chakales, "Volos, Looted, Pillaged With Typical German Thoroughness During Long Occupation," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 19, 1946, 1:3-5.

¹⁷ "Italians Bomb Greek Villages," The Times (London), April 4, 1941, 3c.

¹⁸ "German Drive Slowed Down," The Times (London), April 14, 1941, 4a.

¹⁹ "Intense German Air Activity," The Times (London), April 17, 1941, 4a.

²⁰ "Enemy Claims in Greece," Times London 22 April 1941, 3b.

chickpeas, bread, olive oil, and small amounts of meat. Their daily caloric intake totaled 600 calories.²¹ This made the population susceptible to tuberculosis, skin diseases, and malaria.²² Many items such as vitamins, food, and clothing sent to Greece by the Swiss Red Cross sat in warehouses due to lack of transportation. By the spring of 1942, the Nazis had confiscated every automobile. In order to distribute relief supplies to outlying areas, United Nations Relief workers used wagons drawn by mules or oxen.²³

By the time the citizens of Orlando read Chakales's accounts regarding the hardships in Volos, Greece, 6,000 cans of food awaited volunteers to carry them to the army warehouse.²⁴ News of the Greek tragedies inspired citizens to donate another 1,208 cans; however, the citizens of Orlando needed twelve times the amount of food already collected in order to fill five boxcars, the amount promised by the Jaycees when the plan started.²⁵ Albert W. Ayre, a volunteer working full-time with the Jaycees, sorting and packing food, said that Orlando must accelerate its food drive or many Volos residents would perish within the 90 days allotted for the drive. The warehouseman estimated that 35,000 cans of food were needed daily. That meant that a donation of five cans of food per every man, woman, and child in the city was needed in order to keep the Orlando Plan going.²⁶

²¹ "First Steers to Be Canned for Volos Slaughtered Saturday," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 5, 1946, 5:6.

²² Dr. Gilbert Osincup, "Starvation Rampant in Greece, Need for Food Grows Daily," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 27, 1946, 27: 3 and 4.

²³ L.S. Chakales, "Volos, Looted, Pillaged With Typical German Thoroughness During Long Occupation," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 19, 1946, 1:3-5.

²⁴ "Grocers Aid Volos Campaign," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 2, 1946, 1:2.

²⁵ "Volos Workers Need More Help," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 8, 1946, 4:1.

²⁶ "Committee Asks Five Food Cars For Greek City," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 23, 1946, 1:1.

Civic organizations and citizens of Orlando increased their efforts to feed Volos. Reverend Fayette Hall, President of the Orange County Ministerial Association, said that ministers belonging to the association would either use the Orlando Plan as the basis for their sermons, or urge its support from the pulpit. In addition, he announced plans to install receptacles in church entranceways where church members could drop extra cans of food. Judson Walker, Superintendent of Orange County Schools, pledged the cooperation of all the schools in the area by allowing the placement of collection bins in each school.²⁷

Through letters to the editor of the Orlando Morning Sentinel, citizens urged support. "Uncle Abe," from Mount Dora, coined the term "Vittles for Volos" in a letter about changing to daylight savings time. Lamenting the fact that the United States Congress had voted to adopt daylight savings time, this local resident wrote, "But I am satisfied jest so long as we don't go back to tellin' time by a sun dial or as the old Greeks used I done read about what sez [sic] what is the time by that dern coconut shell. Vittles for Volos is my slogan." The slogan caught on, and became the rallying cry for the Orlando Plan.²⁸

Grocers and restaurants increased their collection efforts, as well. Leading grocers in the area, including J.W. Lyles, District Superintendent of Winn and Lovett, L.W. Graves, District Superintendent of A&P, W.E. Damper and Herman Smith, managers of All-American Food Stores, and Jud Underhill, President of the Orlando

²⁷ "Food Stockpile for Volos Grows," Orlando Morning Sentinel, April 26, 1946, 2:3.

²⁸ "Feeding Volos Any Old Time, Ignoring All Other Times," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 3, 1946, 8:5.

Retail Grocers, all agreed to place collection bins in various stores. C.B. Treadway and Bishop of Florida Canned Store Association agreed to enlist all the stores belonging to their association in collecting food. The Harris-George Grocery Company, in conjunction with Eddie Meiner's Grocery Company, agreed to match can-for-can the contributions gathered by their customers.²⁹

Orlando restaurants, led by the Jaycees subcommittee on restaurant participation chairmen Bill Whitcomb, and John Camichos owner of the Southland Restaurant, aided the Orlando Plan. Camichos initiated two campaigns at his restaurant that other restaurant owners also incorporated. At the Southland he placed a display of canned foods near the cashier (his wife, Geneva Camichos) with the wholesale prices listed. As the diner paid their bill, a poster encouraged them to add enough for the purchase of one or more cans of food, at the wholesale price, and place them in the collection bin. Another food-raising campaign invited diners to spend their dessert money on canned food for Volos.³⁰

The largest contributions came from the minority sector of Orlando, African-Americans and women. African-Americans contributed both labor and food to the Orlando Plan. Winter Garden Junior High School, an all African-American school, collected 1,800 cans of food; in addition, an African-American civic club collected 500

²⁹ "Negroes Boost Volos Campaign," *Orlando Morning Sentinel*, May 24, 1946, 1:2.

³⁰ "Housewives Aid Campaign," *Orlando Morning Sentinel*, May 24, 1946, 1:2.
³⁰ "Restaurants Aid Food-for-Volos Drive; Committee Meets Today," *Orlando Morning Sentinel*, May 1, 1946, 1:2-3.

cans of food.³¹ The largest contribution, however, came from an all African-American high school. In less than one week 800 African-American students at Jones High School collected 5,000 cans of food for Volos. This equaled seven cans per student. In order to promote the canned-food drive the students conducted contests between each class. When the drive lagged, class presidents took money from class treasuries to purchase canned food.³² Surprised at the number of cans collected, Jaycees chairman Burton Thornall called this the finest civic gesture he ever witnessed.³³

It is possible that this fund raising effort may be a direct result of earlier actions by Camichos. During the depression, Camichos provided many free meals to poor people in the Orlando area, including African-Americans. These people would arrive after the dinner hour, and receive a hot meal of meat, vegetables, and bread. In addition, Camichos hired several African-Americans as kitchen help during the 1930s and 1940s. Perhaps these same people were repaying his kindness by assisting his family and friends trapped in Greece.

Orlando housewives proved themselves the backbone of the Orlando Plan. From the outset, Jaycees Chairman Clem Brossier called the campaign "primarily a woman's battle," because the housewives purchased the food, thereby making them the ones who ensure the donations arrive at the drop-off points. The Women's Community Council, chaired by Mrs. Edna Giles Fuller, represented 37 women's organizations in Orlando, all

³¹ "Negroes Boost Volos Campaign," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 28, 1946, 4:5. Please note that the name of the African-American civic group is faded and illegible.

³² "Negro Students Turned Over 5,000 Cans of Food for Volos," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 10, 1946.

³³ *Ibid.*

of which rallied support for the campaign. Using the slogan "Buy 2 Cans-Give 1" as their motto, housewives of the city helped prevent starvation in Volos over the 120 day period.³⁴

The largest contribution by the women of Orlando occurred in May of 1946. George Burke, manager of Dixie Freeze, Incorporated, donated two steers to the Orlando Plan.³⁵ After slaughtering and dressing-down the animals, the amount of beef remaining totaled 601 pounds. Mrs. Mary Jane Alecks and Mrs. M.J. Moss, both of the Women's Community Council Committee, asked volunteers to assist in the canning of the meat, as well as other assorted foodstuffs. On May 15, 1946, women volunteers from the Red Cross, Sorosis Club, and other women's civic groups, converged at the canning facility. Each volunteer brought her own butcher knives, frying pans, aprons, and a lunch to the Country Kitchen, located at 132 W. Kaley Avenue, Orlando, Florida. The project started at 9:00 a.m. and ended at 5:00 p.m.³⁶

It is unclear how many cases of food were actually canned by these women. Reports from the Orlando Morning Sentinel show that the women had canned 22 cases of beef (including beef stew), three cases of honey, 2 cases of beans, 1 case of peas, and 5 cases of pears and various other foods; however, the same article puts the total amount of cases at 792, which clearly does not equal the amount previously mentioned.³⁷

³⁴ "Jaycees, Local Clubs Join in Food Campaign," Orlando Morning Sentinel, April 23, 1946, 1:1.

³⁵ "First Steers to be Canned for Volos Slaughtered on Saturday," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 5, 1946, 5:5.

³⁶ "Canning of Food for Volos to Begin at Country Kitchen," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May, 7, 1946. 1:3.

³⁷ "Women Can 600 Lbs of Beef as Food for Volos Increases," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 15, 1946, 1:4-5.

drive. However, despite the best efforts by the Orlando clubs to reach the goal of five boxcar loads of food, Orlando citizens lagged in their efforts to keep the plan going. On May 21, 1946, Clem Bossier announced the end of the drive. He called for one last concerted effort, to last the remainder of the week, in order to finish three boxcar loads of food to Volos. Reports from Volos, however, of an impending cut in wheat supplies by the United Nations, inspired civic groups and individuals to continue the Orlando Plan through the first week of June. UNRRA had previously cut its per capita wheat allocation to 1,100 calories per day, and anticipated cutting it even further. United Nations officials estimated that Greek citizens needed 2,000 calories per day for minimal subsistence. According to United Nations sources, "Volos is on the edge of starvation and to escape, immediate assistance must be forthcoming from an outside source." UNRRA director in Volos Nicholas G. Trayfors acknowledged that 80 percent of the children and a large number of adults suffered from malnutrition. Citizens in Volos needed 5,100 tons monthly, and that the April, May, and June wheat shipments would fall short of the actual need by 40 percent.³⁸

21-4. In response to this news, Orlando residents increased their support by contributing monetarily, something previously discouraged by I.A. Mayfield, Treasurer of the Jaycees committee.³⁹ The Jaycees agreed to hold all monetary contributions until the end of the

³⁸ "Special Effort Asked in Food For Volos Drive to End Saturday," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 21, 1946, 1: 4&5. See also: L.S. Chakales, "Volos Faces Another Cut in UNRRA Wheat Allocations," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 20, 1946, 1:2.

³⁹ "Committee Asks Five Food Cars For Greek City," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 24, 1946, 1:1. See also: "Cash Donations Accepted to Aid in Feeding of Stricken Volos," Orlando Morning Sentinel, May 14, 1946, 1: 4&5.

drive, at which time they would purchase canned food from Orlando's wholesale grocers, with the money being divided equally among the stores.⁴⁰ By the end of the drive, the cash contributions totaled almost \$1,300.⁴¹

The last fundraiser for Volos took place on June 3, 1946. A group of business leaders, including John H. Ganzel, Mrs. Sue Bussell, Sam Shiver, Hy Roth, Harry Pappas, I.A. Mayfield, and John Camichos formed a committee to sponsor a benefit baseball game. The competing teams were the league-leading Orlando Senators, versus the Daytona Beach Islanders.⁴² The committee intended to make "Volos Night" at Tinker Field, the home field of the Orlando Senators, an overwhelming success. They received over 300 pledges for advance seating, with the price of the tickets selling for \$1.00 for regular seats and \$1.50 for box seats. In addition, the committee agreed that all persons, including players and ballpark employees, would pay their own way into Tinker Field. All proceeds, after operating costs, would go directly to the cash donations already received by the Jaycees. The night of the game, 1,150 baseball fans turned out at rain-soaked Tinker Field to watch the Orlando Senators defeat Daytona Beach by a score of 21-4. At the end of the contest, business manager John H. Ganzel announced that a check for \$1,000.00 would go into the Volos fund.⁴³

With the completion of the baseball game, the Orlando Plan was officially over.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ "Food for Volos Week Set By Mayor; Baseball Game Monday," Orlando Morning Sentinel, June 2, 1946, 1:4&5.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ "Volos Benefit Contest Nets \$1,000," Orlando Morning Sentinel, June 4, 1946, 1:2. The selling price for the tickets was fifty cents more than a regular season game.

Orlando residents returned to their daily lives, many with no concept of how their efforts helped save the city of Volos. The food was shipped at the end of May 1946, but it was not until September 1947 that the official calculations of the food drive were available. For the three-month period, Orlando residents had collected a total of 45,726 pounds of food for Volos.⁴⁴

The impact of the Orlando Plan on Volos was significant. Ironically, the Orlando Morning Sentinel ended all news reports from Greece on the last day of the Orlando Plan; however, Greek newspapers hailed the Orlando Plan, as did individual letters from villagers. The Orlando Sentinel claims that the Orlando Plan saved 60,000 villagers from starvation by providing one meal per day for Volos residents from June 1946 through August 1946. UNRRA officials provided daily meals at community soup kitchens to residents living in and around Volos. Families that had been living on one meal per day consisting of bread and olives were now getting fish, meat, sweet milk, and a variety of canned vegetables.⁴⁵

Correspondence from thankful villagers began arriving as early as June 1946. Mrs. Kadina Toursova wrote to Camichos explaining that her family was living in a cave outside of the city. The Nazis destroyed their home in 1941, and her husband, a fisherman, had become very sick during the winter of 1945. They had not eaten any meat, and very few vegetables since 1943. "Without the kindness of the people of

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ "Residents from Orlando Work To Strengthen Volos," circa 1946 [translated by Lisa C. Camichos].

Orlando, my family certainly would have perished."⁴⁶

John T. Potessaros wrote that his wife had lost 60 pounds since the Nazi occupation. (She weighed only 95 pounds at the time the letter was written). She was depressed, and had not eaten in many days; however, news that food had arrived from America lifted her spirits, and since June she had gained 10 pounds.⁴⁷

Camichos also received a letter from the orphanage in Volos. The money raised at the baseball game had gone to repair the structure that had been hit by German artillery, as well as to purchase blankets for the children. One of the orphans, Pyros Koumouions, who had lost his family to disease and starvation, enclosed a short letter thanking the citizens of Orlando for their efforts.⁴⁸

Greece was still in the middle of a civil war when the Orlando Plan ended, and not every village was as fortunate as Volos in obtaining foreign relief. What the Nazis did not destroy, the Greek Communist rebels did. This was especially true in Northern Greece where Communists from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania formed alliances with Greek Communists. Communists massacred entire families, and Greeks loyal to the Crown. In the village of Kopana the EAM murdered a family of sixteen, and threw their bodies down a well. Of the six-member Almarantis family, only the youngest daughter survived an attack of their village by the EAM. In the village of Peristeri, near Volos, the

⁴⁶ Kadina Toursova, Volos, Greece, to John Camichos, Orlando, Florida, June 16, 1946, Private papers of John Camichos, Collection of Lisa C. Camichos, [translated by Lisa C. Camichos].

⁴⁷ John T. Potessaros, Volos, Greece, to John Camichos, Orlando, Florida, August 15, 1946, Private papers of John Camichos, Collection of Lisa C. Camichos, [translated by Lisa C. Camichos].

⁴⁸ Pyros Koumouions, Volos, Greece, to John Camichos, Orlando, Florida, 1947, Private papers of John Camichos, Collection of Lisa C. Camichos, [translated by Lisa C. Camichos].

EAM executed hundreds of Greek, including Admiral Kriezis, long-time Naval Attaché in London.⁴⁹

During this terrible period, 1946-1949, a fraternal organization in America called American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) formed the Justice for Greece program. Its goal was to raise money to build two hospitals- one in Athens, and the other in Salonika, and to build additional wings on existing hospitals throughout the country.

During World War II AHEPA had worked closely with the Greek War Relief Association. However, after the war ended and the Greek Civil War began, the two groups split. As the GWRA faded, AHEPA began picking up steam. The Justice For Greece campaign was developed because AHEPA Supreme President Harris J. Borrás did not like the fact that the United States State Department had no financial assistance program to help Greece with reconstruction and finance.⁵⁰

The Justice For Greece program began in February 1947 with the election of programs officers and directors. The President was Harris J. Borrás, Chairman of the Board Dr. George Gavaris, Vice President Dr. Fotios Kryistis, Treasurer Louis

⁴⁹ Terrorism in Greece. (Athens, Greece: The Panhellenic [sic] Corporation of the Victims of Communist and ELAS Activities), 1945, 34.

⁵⁰ George J. Leber, The History of the Order of AHEPA. (Washington, D.C.: Order of AHEPA, 1972), 290.

Christopoulos, and General Secretary George Generalis. The goal of the group was to build new hospitals, and additions to existing hospitals for treating civilians hurt in the on-going Civil War. AHEPA raised more than \$4 million towards this goal through fund-raising events, newspaper solicitations, and door-to-door solicitations. As pledged at the beginning of the campaign, AHEPA built hospitals in Athens and in Salonika at the University. AHEPA also gave money to hospitals in Chrysoupolis, Crete, Pyrgos, Paramythia, and Meligala for purposes of building additional wings to accommodate more patients. In an agreement signed with the Greek government, AHEPA also agreed to operate all the non-military hospitals in Greece for four years, starting in 1947 and ending in 1951. During this period, AHEPA provided all medical supplies, food, and medicines for these institutions. Had AHEPA not agreed to fund this operation, thousands of Greek civilians would have perished during the Civil War. The Greek government was not in a financial position to care for its own army, much less for the civilians caught in the line of fire during the bloody conflict with the communists.

What also makes this organization noteworthy is that it enlisted high-ranking government officials into its ranks. Included among these were thirty-four Senators, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the minority and majority leaders in the House of Representatives. According to Booras this, coupled with the letter-writing campaign that brought the Communist threat to the attention of the American people, as well as these key government officials, persuaded President Truman to develop the Truman Doctrine. Certainly these key governmental officials probably influenced American foreign policy at this time, but I question whether they can be given all the

credit for the development of the Truman Doctrine.

The Truman Doctrine, to which we now turn, provided to Greece the largest amount of relief, at the time, ever given to any country, \$350 million. Greece desperately needed the funding provided by the United States government, as it was still embroiled in a civil war. However, what the Truman Doctrine also provided were rules accompanied with the relief funding, something not imposed upon the Greeks by the non-governmental organizations that provided relief.

At the outbreak of the World War II, Britain had guaranteed Greece's borders. Between 1944 and 1946, Britain maintained a strong military and financial hold on Greece. British troops prevented communist factions from infiltrating the central government in Athens, while the British government financed Greek postwar reconstruction; however, by 1946, Britain's internal financial status prohibited it from providing any relief to Greece. This situation had a devastating effect on Greece. Unable to finance the rebuilding of its own country, or to assist the Greeks, Britain urged the United States to assume the responsibility.¹

Greece had not recovered from the Nazi occupation that destroyed its economy, infrastructure, and productive capacity, before it became embroiled in a civil war in 1945.² The Germans demolished 650 communities, leaving 750 thousand people

¹ Terry H. Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain, and The Cold War 1941-1947* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1981), 160; Also see Ian J. Dickson, "Foreign Aid," *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, ed. Alexander DeConde (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), II: pp. 140-2, 373.

² A.A. Paton, "Building Formal Structures of Penetration: The United States in Greece, 1947-1948," *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Ierardi (Hemel Hempstead and London: University Press of New England, 1981), 237. Also see Louis W. Koenig, (ed.), *The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practices* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 293.